OBJECTIVE： To find out the main problems about quality supervision over Chinese herbal pieces and effective supervision strategies. MEDTHODS： First， static and dynamic models of the game between the enterprises engaged in the production and business of Chinese herbal pieces and local food and drug administration were respectively established， to which pure strategy Nash equilibrium analysis and mixed strategy Nash equilibrium analysis were made. Next， the model of the game between the superior regulatory authorities and the basic-level regulatory authorities was established， to which mixed strategy analysis was made to find out the supervision factors relevant to the quality safety of Chinese herbal pieces. RESULTS & CONCLUSIONS： Based on the current situation of quality supervision over Chinese herbal pieces and the analysis results of the game models， it is suggested that at present the Chinese herbal medicine regulatory authorities of China should work hard to promote the reform of the supervision system， reduce supervision cost （including the guidance of the large-scale and centralized production of Chinese medicinal materials and unified appliance of approval number to the administration of Chinese herbal pieces）， establish a systematic and comprehensive system of rewards and punishments， create a professional supervisor staff （including the strengthening of basic-level supervisor staff creation and the improvement of personnel’s quality， the standardization of the law enforcement of regulatory authorities and the combination of proper power delegation to lower levels and strict supervision）， and balance the relationship between the government and the public in supervision to increase the public’s awareness of responsibility.